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RE-KANTING POSTMODERNISM?:
DERRIDA'S RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF
REASON ALONE
James K. A. Smith

This essay considers the legacy of Kant's philosophy of religion as appropriated by Jacques Derrida in his recent, "Foi et savoir: les deux sources de
la 'religion' aux limites de la simple raison." Derrida's adoption of this
Kantian framework raises the question of how one might describe this as a
postmodern account of religion, which in turn raises the question of the
relationship between modernity and postmodernity in general, and
Derrida's relationship to Kant in particular. Following an exposition of
Derrida's notion of a formal "ethical" religion as a repetition of Kant's critique in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, I offer a critique of
Derrida's (and Kant's) "formalization" of religion and the relationship
between faith and reason, arguing that a more persistent postmodernism
requires a de-formalization of the modern concern for justice, appreciating
its determinate prophetic origin.

Could it be that deconstruction-offspring of enfant terrible, Jacques
Derrida-is in fact only a new attempt to liberate humanity from its selfincurred tutelage? In other words, is deconstruction simply a new
Enlightenment, a project we can trace to Kant? And conversely, could it be
that Kant was (unwittingly) engaged in deconstruction? Derrida himself
seems to hint at just such a genealogy, suggesting something of a German
origin of this French movement: "I am resolutely in favor," he proclaims,
"of a new university Enlightenment [Aufkliirungl."l And more recently,
expressly evoking the Kantian tradition of critique, he has undertaken the
task of considering religion "within the limits of reason alone"-a "religion
without religion"2 which, in the spirit of Kant's "reflective faith,'" would
constitute a "universal" religion. 4 For Derrida, like Kant, such a religion is
ultimately a matter of ethics or justice, such that the "religion" which
Derrida discloses is remarkably similar to Kant's "moral religion," including the tie which binds it to democracy.' Further, this plays itself out within a framework which understands the relationship between faith and
knowledge in a manner we might describe as "hyper-Kanhan," faulting
even Kant for failing to radically think religion within the limits of reason
alone-for not being enlightened enough (FS 19/11). Thus Derrida, the
consummate "postmodernist," lays claim to a filiation which is distinctly
modern, making deconstruction a child of the Enlightenment.
Derrida's appropriation of Kant when reflecting on religion, along with
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his affirmation of a new Aufkliirung, raises the question of the (dis)continuity between modernity (and Kant, in particular) and what has been commonly described as "postmodernity." Is postmodernity a "new
Enlightenment?" If so, in what sense is it "new?" Derrida's philosophy of
religion and his account of the relationship between faith and reason seems
to be little more than a repetition of Kant's own account, and thus subject
to the same critique as other Enlightenment accounts of the "essence" of
religion (FS 34/23), of which Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone is a celebrated example." Further, this specter of Kant (evoked by
Derrida himself), problematizes accounts of postmodernism which posit a
radical discontinuity with the modern, Enlightenment projece Instead, it
seems that these purported "postmodern" accounts of religion differ little
from Enlightenment criticisms. For some, this would be a redeeming trait
of postmodernism. But what if that Enlightenment critique of religion was
itself subjected to criticism? In that case, Derrida would here simply be
repeating one of the most problematic Enlightenment prejudices against
determinate or "dogmatic" religion-a prejudice that should be unveiled
as such (pace Gadamer8) and subject to (postmodern) critique.
The goal of this paper is to provide an exposition of the way in which
Derrida repeats Kant's project of thinking religion within the limits of reason alone (concurrently pursuing questions about the relationship between
modernity and postmodernitt) and its disclosure of a purportedly "pure"
moral religion, and then subject such a project to a more persistently postmodern (and perhaps Augustinian) critique, developing an alternative
understanding of the relationship between faith and reason.

1. Thinking Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone:
Derrida's Repetition of Kant
The occasion for Derrida's reflection on religion is the surprising "return of
religion" (FS 13/5); or better, the so-called "return" of religion which surprised only a post-Marxist or post-Feuerbachian academic communitywhich is to say, a post-Kantian, post-Enlightenment community.lO But why
is this so surprising? Does it not only surprise those who naively opposed
religion and science (Enlightenment, Reason, Criticism)-"as though the
one could not but put an end to the other" (FS 13/5). Instead, Derrida
argues, a different "schema" will be required to think the relationship
between faith and knowledge, suggesting that Derrida will provide an
alternative to the Enlightenment notion of an "autonomous" reason which
is untainted by faith (found in Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Feuerbach). Here
several problems arise which need to be explored. First, does Derrida really provide an alternative schema for the relationship between faith and
knowledge, or is his conception of this relation in fact a hyper-modern
notion of "autonomous" reason-a repetition of Kant? Second, is this critique of religion-whether found in Kant or Derrida, whether modern or
postmodern-a philosophically viable project, or is it itself subject to critique? Third, are there other elements of Derrida's analysis of religion
which undermine his attempt to think religion within the limits of reason
alone, resulting in the deconstruction of Derrida's critique?! I The first
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question is taken up in Part I, and the final two questions are the focus of
Part II.
For Derrida, in a gesture he describes as Kantian (FS 16/8), the question
of religion opens as a question of abstraction:
How "to talk religion?" Of religion? Singularly of religion, today?
How dare we speak of it in the singular without fear and trembling,
this very day? And so briefly and so quickly? [. .. J To give oneself
the necessary courage, arrogance or serenity, perhaps one must pretend for an instant to abstract, to abstract from everything or almost
everything, in a certain way. Perhaps one must take one's chance in
resorting to the most concrete and most accessible, but also the most
barren and desert-like, of all abstractions (FS 9/1).
Thus abstraction becomes linked to a discussion of "salvation" and liberation; but here a question arises: "Should one save oneself by abstraction or
from abstraction" (FS 9/1, emphasis added)? Derrida seems to opt for the
former: in order to speak of religion, one must ("perhaps") engage in
abstraction from the concrete and determinate religions ("almost")-a kind
of flight to the desert, separated from the particularity of historical, determinate religions in order to discover, in this desert of abstraction, a "universal"
religion whose structure is a relation of justice. By this process of "desertification" (FS 27/17), Derrida proposes to disclose a structure of ethical obligation which precedes the structures of determinate religion and morality:
"Even if it is called the social nexus, link to the other in general, this fiduciary 'link' would precede all determinate community, all positive religion,
every onto-anthropo-theological horizon" (FS 26/16). In other words, this
process of abstraction exhibits a basis of ethical responsibility which does
not depend upon any conditions of experience (cp. RWLRA 94-96).
Abstraction, then, is the movement by which Derrida seeks to disclose
the religious structure of responsibility, or the outline of a "pure moral religion" lifted out of the determinate and concrete historical religions.
Throughout "Foi et savoir," Derrida takes up this question of the relationship between the universal and the particular (or better, the universal and
the singular'2 )-so central to Kant's ethical framework as outlined in both
the Groundwork and RWLRA-through the metaphor of topos: of place
(lieu), location. Could there be a religion which is not tied to a particular
place-a "Promised Land"Ll-and so a particular history of revelation (FS
17/8)? For if the foundation for ethical obligation were to be located in a
particular religion, with ties to a particular revelation and place, we would
compromise its universality. But it is precisely this penchant for universality which pushes Derrida to the "desert" of abstraction. As he reflects on
the Isle of Capri, these particular individuals who have gathered to "talk
religion" share "an unreserved taste, if not an unconditional preference, for
what, in politics, is called republican democracy as a universalizable
model" (FS 16/8)-an ideal which can be traced to the lights of the
Enlightenment and the project which sought liberation from all external
authority and power, especially religious dogmatism. l4 And thus our
predilection for republican democracy as a univ('Ysal ideal would seem to
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commit us to a certain epoche-thinking religion "within the limits of reason alone" (FS 16/8), which for Derrida is to think religion "in the desert."
The "desert," for him, is a kind of metaphor for a level of abstraction or
universality which is disconnected from all particularities of place and history, such that this "desert" of abstraction would represent a "place that
could well have been more than archi-originary, the most anarchic and
anarchivable place possible" (FS 26/16). Elsewhere, this desert of abstraction is described as a place that is not a place, a 'place' which "comes under
no geography, geometry, or geophysics."ls Once this epoche is effected,
the ethical structures of democracy which 'remain' are understood as a priorjl6-divorced from any particular historical or geographical heritage,
even if they maintain a certain affinity with particular determinate religious traditions.
It is Kant's notion of a "reflective [reflektierende] faith" which Derrida
describes as "a concept whose possibility might well open the space for our
discussion" (FS 19/10, trans. modified). This is a faith which "does not
depend essentially upon any historical revelation and thus agrees with the
rationality of purely practical reason" (FS 19/10), which is why it is
opposed to "dogmatic faith" which "claims to know and thereby ignores
the difference between faith and knowledge" (FS 19/10). There is an
important difference, he notes, between 'believing one knows and knowing one believes" (FS 54/40). Reflective faith has been purged of its particularity, immune to any contamination of time or place. Thus, while Kant
remained indebted to his Pietist heritage,J7 the impetus for his reflections
on religion was philosophical, and more specifically, the telos of his own
critical project, such that Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone has been
described as a kind of "fourth critique." At the heart of this Kantian project
is a distinct concept of the relationship between faith and reason, presaged
in the famous dictum from the Second Preface to the Critique of Pure
Reasol1: "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to
make room for faith."IR The relationship between faith and knowledge is
precisely one of heterogeneity: arriving at the limits of scientific knowledge,
it is necessary to displace a dogmatic metaphysics in order to make room
for faith and a concept of God-one of the positive implications of laying
out the principles of pure reason. In other words, the procedures of reason
which issue in knowledge are autonomous vis-a.-vis faith: knowledge is the
product of operations which do not in any way involve faith, whereas our
consciousness (not "knowledge") of freedom and moral obligation is characterized by a faith which displaces any priority which speculative reason
might seek for itselF'
This question of the relationship-or rather, heterogeneity-between
faith and knowledge is taken up more systematically after the ethical
works, which further clear the space and mark the necessity for thinking
religion within the limits of reason alone. Thus RWLRA operates with an
understanding of the relationship between faith and reason laid down
much earlier. But while space was cleared for religious faith through a critique of reason, faith itself is subject to critique; that is, the boundaries or
limits must be established lest faith, as reason is wont to do, seeks to claim
more than it can deliver. This concern is already seen in CPR, where Kant
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remarks: "No one, indeed, will be able to boast that he knows that there is a
God, and a future life; if he knows this, he is the very man for whom I have
long [and vainly] sought" (A828-29/B856-57). Faith needs to be reminded
that it is just that-faith, and not knowledge. 20 It is in the first of four parerga in RWLRA that this same concern is expressed by the distinction
between "reflective" and "dogmatic" faith. Broaching the matter of grace,
Kant suggests that "[r]eason believes this with a faith which (with respect
to the possibility of this supernatural complement) might be called
reflective; for dogmatic faith, which proclaims itself as a form of knowledge,
appears to her dishonest or presumptuous" (RWLRA 48). "In making
such assertions and pretensions to knowledge/' he later remarks, "reason
simply passes beyond the limits of its own insight" (RWLRA 63-64), claiming to know where it cannot see. In other words, dogmatic faith fails to
recognize itself as faith, and thus fails to recognize the heterogeneity
between faith and knowledge.
In his lectures, Kant not only lays out this distinction but demonstrates
why it is beneficial: faith in these matters is, in a sense, more virtuous. For
instance, our moral belief in the existence of God is not a mere "hypothesis" or "opinion" (arguing from the contingency of the world to a supreme
author), but rather demands "firm belief" because it is from "some
absolutely necessary datum."21 "Hence our faith/' Kant concludes,
is not scientific knowledge, and thank heaven it is not! For God's wisdom is apparent in the very fact that we do not know that God exists,
but that we should believe that God exists. For suppose we could
attain to scientific knowledge of God's existence, through our experience or in some other way (even if the possibility of this knowledge
cannot be immediately thought). And suppose further that we could
really reach as much certainty through this knowledge as we do
through intuition. Then in this case, all morality would break down. 22
Morality would break down because it would no longer be voluntary, and
the moral agent would act out of fear of punishment rather than virtue.
Thus, "as regards our morality, it is very good that our knowledge is not
scientific knowledge but faith. For in this way the fulfillment of my duty
will be far purer and more unselfish.,m Hence we can see why the confusion of faith and knowledge-as in "dogmatic faith"-would in fact be
detrimental to morality. For the sake of morality, it is imperative that we
recognize and maintain the heterogeneity between faith and knowledge.
The result will be a "pure religious faith" (RWLRA 94)-"rational" or
"reflective" faith-which has both purged itself of dogmatism (RWLRA
48,63-64) and extirpated any vestige of elements which derive from particular, determinate, historical faiths (RWLRA 94-115). The latter "kenotic"
movement is necessary in order to achieve the universality which is
required of a moral religion-the only "true" religion (RWLRA 95,98).
Indeed, "a church dispenses with the most important mark of truth, namely, a rightful claim to universality" (RWLRA 100; cpo 105). Thus "pure
moral religion" stands not only in contrast to "dogmatic faith" (which fails
to recognize the heterogeneity of faith and knowledge), but also "ecclesias-
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tical faith," which is dependent upon a particular, historical revelation
(RWLRA 96). Kant in fact argues that the term "religion" ought to be used
more prudently, advocating that what we describe as "religions" ought to
be termed "faiths," since "[olne does too great honor to most people by
saying of them: They profess this or that religion. For they know none and
desire none-statutory ecclesiastical faith is all that they understand"
(RWLRA 98-99). In a manner very similar to Derrida's concern regarding
"wars of religion" in the Middle East and Eastern Europe," Kant argues
that "so-called religious wars" were in fact devoid of religion and are only
"wrangles over ecclesiastical faith" (RWLRA 99).
This distinction between "faiths" which are particular, historical and
determinate and a "religion" which is universal is reproduced in Derrida's
own distinction between particular "messianisms" and the "messianic" as a
universal structure. Motivated by a similar concern regarding the contingency of the historical and determinate, the messianic, or "messianicity
without messianism," is defined as "the opening to the future or to the
coming of the other as the advent of justice but without horizon of expectation and without prefiguration" (FS 27/17). But why this latter requirement? Why must it be a justice which cannot be pre-determined or "prefigured?" Because any pre-determination would be precisely a determination, and for Derrida, it is precisely determination itself which is unjust. In
other words, any "horizon of expectation" [horizon d'attente1 or predelineated anticipation would undo the universality of such justice, representing
an injustice. Thus the "messianic exposes itself to absolute surprise" (FS
28/17); it is a "general structure of experience" which denotes a responsibility to the other as justice (FS 28/18). This responsibility must be determined by the other and therefore cannot be prefigured or determined by the
subject of responsibility. As such, to delineate this general "messianic"
structure, one must engage in abstraction, such that abstraction becomes a
kind of liberation, an "abstract messianicity" (FS 28/18). So, this "general
structure of experience," which is the structure of justice,
does not depend upon any messianism [i.e., determinate religion]' it
follows no determinate revelation, it belongs properly to no
Abrahamic religion (even if I am obliged here, "among ourselves," for
essential reasons of language and of place, of culture, of a provisional
rhetoric and a historical strategy of which I wiIl speak later, to continue giving it names marked by the Abrahamic religions) [FS 28/181.
Thus, like a Kantian moral religion, Derrida's "messianic" is not dependent
upon any historical, determinate "revelation" (cp. RWLRA 94-95).
However, while both Kant's "pure moral religion" and Derrida's "messianic" (or "religion without religion") eschew any dependence upon particular, determinate faiths, they both still affirm the priority of faith in matters practical. Thus both are characterized by a dual movement: on the one
hand, discharging determinate religion in the name of rationality /universality; on the other hand, displacing knowledge in order to make room for
the faith of practical reason-justice, responsibility, la religion which is la
reponse. The tie that binds me to the other in responsibility is, at root, a
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bond of faith~a "fiduciary 'link'" (FS 26/16). "This abstract messianicity,"
Derrida argues, "belongs from the very beginning to the experience of
faith, of believing, of a credit that is irreducible to knowledge and of a trust
that 'founds' all relation to the other in testimony" (FS 28/18). This would
be a 'universal' faith before every determinate faith, akin to Kant's "pure
religious faith" which would be the condition of possibility for any "ecclesiastical faith" (RWLRA 95). So "religion" ~a universal religion~whose
structure is unveiled as the messianic (not a messianism), is in its very
structure a relation of justice: my responsibility to the other. But it is not a
responsibility that I know; rather, it is one that I believe. So it is necessary
to deny knowledge in order to make room for this responsibility. And it is
"[tlhis justice, which I distinguish from law25 [droitl, [thatl alone allows the
hope, beyond all 'messianisms,' of a universalizable culture of singularities" (FS 28/18)~a kind of "kingdom of ends" where the singularities are
precisely others (echoing both Kierkegaard and Levinas). This is because
"the other makes the law, the law is other: to give ourselves back, and up,
to the other. To every other and to the utterly other [A tout autre et au tout
autrel" (FS 47/34). This faith inscribes itself at the very origin of language
and thus is characterized by universality.26 And it is "the universalizable
culture of this faith" which "alone permits a 'rational' and universal discourse on the subject of 'religion'" (28/18). It is a messianicity which is
"stripped of everything, as it should [sic], this faith without dogma" which
marks the possibility of a universal justice (FS 28/18) which leads Derrida
to associate this founding faith with what Montaigne and Pascal describe
as "the mystical foundation of authority" (29/18).27
Thus the universal structure of ethical obligation, on the one hand clearly disengaged from any particular faith or religion, is nevertheless itself
'known' only by a kind of practical faith or trust. Here we see the clear
repetition of the Kantian dual movement noted above. Further, such
abstraction has, according to Derrida, liberating implications: "this abstraction, without denying faith, liberates a universal rationality and the political democracy that cannot be dissociated from it" (FS 29/19).
Kant, however, has not made it to the "desert." In fact, Derrida criticizes Kant for not properly carrying out a radical abstraction or "desertification" of moral obligation. While repeating Kant's demand that a pure
moral religion be decontaminated of any particular, determinate, historical
faith, Derrida concludes that such a process of decontamination was not
properly completed by Kant. This in two ways: first, Kant continues to
privilege the Christian religion, such that "the Christian religion would be
the only truly 'moral' religion" (PS 19/10). Second, "pure morality and
Christianity are in dissociable in their essence and in their concept" (FS
19/10). In other words, it would be a contradiction for moral obliga tion to
be purely "rational" and non-Christian and so it must remahl, in a veiled
sense, linked to the particularity and historicity of a Christian revelation.
"The unconditionality of the categorical imperative," Derrida concludes,
"is evangelical. The moral law inscribes itself at the bottom of our hearts
like a memory of the Passion. When it addresses us, it either speaks the
idiom of the Christian~or is silent" (FS 19/11). This is why Derrida considers his disclosure of the "messianic" a completion of the process of
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decontamination. The messianic, he claims, even if it remains linked 'in
name' to the Abrahamic religions, remains a completely universal structure of responsibility which in no way depends upon any particular religion or messianism. This, of course, does not call into question Kant's project, but rather completes it: an unveiling of the structure of moral obligation which is decontaminated of any dependence upon a particular, determinate, historical religion-and yet which is 'known' only by faith.
II. The Very Idea of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone:

A Postmodern Critique
So Derrida (the postmodern) does not question the Kantian (modern) project of thinking religion within the limits of reason alone; indeed, he takes it
up in order to complete it. The problem which arises, for Derrida, is just
how such a project would be possible: "How then to think-within the limits of reason alone-a religion which, without again becoming 'natural religion,' would today be effectively universal" (F523/14)? But this is a question that Kant also tackles when he considers the relationship between
"historical" or "ecclesiastical faith" and "pure religious faith." What is the
relationship between these two? While the latter is superior to the former,
is ecclesiastical faith nevertheless the necessary condition for the idea of
morality which characterizes pure religious faith? Kant is somewhat
ambiguous on this point, though I think we can infer his answer. He simply states that, "[i]n men's striving towards an ethical commonwealth,
ecclesiastical faith thus naturally precedes pure religious faith" (RWLRA
97). But what does Kant mean by saying the one "naturally precedes" the
other? This is somewhat clarified by a brief note which asserts that "morally, this order ought to be reversed" (RWLRA 97n). In other words, it
seems that Kant argues that "morally" -which must also mean "rationally" -pure religious faith is prior to any ecclesiastical faith, but historically
speaking, ecclesiastical faiths are the means by which we come to reflect on
and understand the "one true religion." In the order of knowing, ecclesiastical faith is prior, but in the order of being, pure religious (i.e., moral) faith
comes first. Thus Kant routinely refers to historical or ecclesiastical faiths
as "vehicles" for the propagation of pure religious faith: "it remains true
once for all that a statutory ecclesiastical faith is associated with pure religious faith as its vehicle and as the means of public union of men for its
promotion" (RWLRA 98).28 And eventually, one would hope pure religious faith could makes its way around on its own, no longer needing a
ride from ecclesiastical faith. As Kant projects:
When ... an historical faith attaches itself to pure religion, as its vehicle, but with the consciousness that it is only a vehicle, and when this
faith, having become ecclesiastical, embraces the principle of a continual approach to pure religious faith, in order to finally dispense with
the historical vehicle, a church thus characterized can at any time be
called the true church (RWLRA ] 06).
The job of the church, then, as a still particular historical faith, is to work
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itself out of a job, to no longer be needed as a promoter for pure religion.
As a kind of "tutor" to the moral law, ecclesiastical faith plays only a
propadeutic role. Derrida, as we have noted above, questions this genealogy, suggesting that the roles of father and son have been reversed-that, in
fact, the Categorical Imperative remains, by filiation, Christian and hence
both dependent upon and product of a particular, determinate "ecclesiastical" faith (FS 19/10-11).
This question of precedence or conditions also arises, not surprisingly,
in Derrida's very Kantian approach to the issue. For Derrida, the question
is: does the messianic or "religion" here outlined precede determinate messianisms as their condition of possibility? Or is it possible to sketch this
universal messianic structure only on the basis of particular, determinate
revelations?
The question remains open, and with it that of knowing whether this
desert can be thought and left to announce itself 'before" the desert
that we know (that of the revelations and retreats, of the lives and
deaths of God, of all the figures of kenosis or of transcendence, of religio or of historical "religions"); or whether, "on the contrary," it is
"from" this last desert [historical religions] that we can glimpse that
which precedes the first, which I call the desert in the desert (FS 3132/21).
While here Derrida seems content to remain undecided, even advocating
"tolerance" (PS 32-33/21-22), this response to the question is disappointing
and, in truth, a punt on Derrida's part. This is not a question of ethical
"undecidability" (which is a condition of all decisions which demands precisely that one decide) but simple indecision on his part, since either possibility (and I cannot see other options) would be problematic for him on his
own grounds. He would either end up siding with a particular determinate
religion (and here it is precisely his Enlightenment penchant for universality
which prevents him from doing so), or for a purely transcendental structure-also a deconstructive heresy.2o Further, he has earlier already
answered the question, opting for the latter stance: the "messianic," he has
told us, "does not depend upon any messianism, it follows no determinate
revelation, it belongs properly to no Abrahamic religion" (FS 28/18). The
messianic, then, as a priori, is a transcendental condition for all particular,
determinate religions and is itself immune from any particular faith.
Here I would unpack two criticisms of Derrida, which also constitute
criticisms of Kant and the general modern project of thinking religion within the limits of reason alone. First, affirming Derrida's unveiling of the
determinate "evangelical" heritage of the Categorical Imperative, we must
subject Derrida's claims to the criticism he leveled against Kant, viz., that
the ethical structure disclosed by this process of desert abstraction retains
very distinct geo-political ties: to Abrahamic, Western understandings of
ethical obligation and to political democracy. In other words, the elements
of this "general structure" remain determined by a particular time, history,
and place. And indeed, one of the' articles of faith' of deconstruction is that
it could not be otherwise; as a result, both Kant and Derrida's own project

RE-KANTING POSTMODERNISM

567

of a "purely rational religion" must falter on this inescapable particularity.
It is true that Derrida claims that the messianic is "Abrahamic" only in

name (FS 28/18). But if so, then why that name? Why not another?30
Could this ethical structure be described as "kharmic" or "Taoist?" Why
not? Because in the end--or rather, in the beginning-it remains an understanding of ethical obligation which owes its disclosure to a determinate
prophetic (more specifically, Hebrew31 ) tradition, the same tradition which
gave birth to Kant's Categorical Imperative. Further, it remains committed
to a very determinate political ideal: republican democracy.32 While
Derrida does concede that our understanding of this moral obligation is a
matter of faith, he fails to recognize that it is also particular and determinate. However, it should be noted that the particular or determinate
genealogy of this ethical structure does not disqualify it from moral
import; that would only be the case if we continued to operate with the
hope of being able to step outside history, which is precisely what is challenged by Derrida. Instead, I would argue that we ought to: (1) recognize
that every ethical and political framework must necessarily have a determinate and historical origin, even a "religious" origin, broadly understood"; and (2) recognize that the ethico-political ideal outlined by both
Kant and Derrida finds its determinate heritage in the prophetic and
Christian tradition.
Further, it is not simply a question of the genealogy or heritage of this
structure of ethical obligation (whether Kant's Categorical Imperative or
Derrida' "messianic") which is a problem, nor is its universality per se.
Instead, at issue is its mode of disclosure, revelation, or what we might
describe-in a more Kantian gesture-as the question of its justificatiol1. 34
In other words, what is at stake is not the ontological universality of the
messianic, but rather the epistemological particularity of its disclosure. As
noted above, the particularity of the messianic's geo-political heritage does
not disqualify it from universal ethical import; in other words, to disclose
its determinate origin is not to argue that such an ethical obligation only
applies to persons within that tradition. The (Jewish) understanding of
obligation outlined by Emmanuel Levinas (precursor to Derrida's "messianic") is also understood to be universal in its scope; that is, it characterizes all human intersubjective relationships. But it is only disclosed through
a particular tradition, even a particular revelation, which must be shared
by any who would understand this structure. At stake, then, is an epistemological issue, not an ontological one. Ontologie ally, the structure of
obligation inheres in all human relationships, but it can only be "known"
or "disclosed" through a particular revelation or faith-tradition. This is
why the particular religion or revelation cannot function as a disposable
"vehicle" in the sense that Kant suggests, because it is this particular tradition which is the condition for its disclosure or legitimation. The particular
faith is the criterion for legitimation. What falters in postmodernity-and
Derrida himself has contributed to its demise-is precisely the notion of a
"reason" which could be a universal criterion for justifying just such a
claim regarding the messianic. So what is disqualified is not the universality of the messianic, but rather any appeal or epistemological claim which
could claim to 'demonstrate' its legitimacy outside of particular traditions
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(i.e., outside particular "faiths").35
This points to the second criticism. The notion of an autonomous or
"pure" reason-untainted by either history or faith (or prejudice) is an
Enlightenment myth. Derrida's project of thinking religion within the limits of reason alone depends upon a heterogeneity between faith and knowledge which presupposes that reason conducts itself within a pure,
autonomous arena. Such a pure reason in Kant has been the subject of criticism since Hegel. As Merold Westphal observes, "For Kant, the forms and
categories that constitute the phenomenal world are at work in all human
cognition, at all times, and in all places. But almost immediately people
began to notice the operation of historically specific a priories constituting
a variety of human worlds."36 In other words, reason itself is not free and
cannot be free of all prejudice, but rather begins from certain cultural
assumptions or, at the very least-as Derrida notes-an implicit trust in
language. More specifically, as I have argued elsewhere/7 reason is always
already grounded in a world view which constitutes a fundamental trust or
commitment. As a result, faith and knowledge are not as heterogeneous as
Kant and Derrida would have us believe. It is here that I would locate the
Augustinian moment of this critique of Kant and Derrida: I do not believe
only where I cannot know; rather, I believe in order to know. Faith-whatever that faith might be-is the necessary condition for knowledge. So
their relation is not one of heterogeneity but rather dependence. Thus the
attempt to think religion within the limits of reason alone would not be a
project of formalization or secularization (attempting to distill a "purified"
or "uncontaminated" rational religion), but more a kind of comparative
theology: the attempt to think one faith within the limits of another faith.
As such, the project itself becomes questionable, or at least the assumptions which motivate it would be dismantled. At that point it would seem
fair to ask why the project should be carried out at all. That is not to say, of
course, that one is opposed to enlightenment, or even critique; but it would
open the space for a new appreciation of Enlightenment as "illumination."
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